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General Social Survey, the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the online platform NeighborGoods, and
my own survey, I estimate the current and potential value of decentralized sharing. I find that
today peer-to-peer borrowing is worth at least $179 a year for 30 percent of Americans and at least
$774 for 8 percent of Americans. If the online platforms are able to facilitate high levels of sharing
among loosely-tied individuals, the annual benefit to the average household would be modest but
significant, perhaps one thousand dollars a year. My analysis suggests that that there are significant
gains from sharing tools, media, gear, electronics, toys, pets, vacation homes, and lodging, but the
largest gains will likely come from sharing privately-owned vehicles.
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1.

Introduction

There are “gains from sharing” goods when the cost to the lender is less than the benefit to the
borrower. Relatives, friends, and neighbors have historically shared tools, media, gear, electronics,
toys, space, and vehicles, and the internet is reducing the transaction costs of decentralized
borrowing and lending among strangers. The websites Couchsurfing, NeighborGoods, Sharetribe,
and Spotwag provide platforms for people to share goods for free; Airbnb and RelayRides provide
new rental markets for people to share lodging and vehicles.
The “sharing economy” has received considerable attention in the mass media, from Rachel
Botsman’s TED talk on “The Case for Collaborative Consumption”, to The Economist’s March 2013
cover story, to Thomas Friedman’s July 20th, 2013 op-ed in the New York Times, “Welcome to the
Sharing Economy”. Researchers are beginning to address the sharing economy as well, and
Agyeman, McLaren, and Schaeffer-Borrego (2013) provide a useful review of much of that work.
However, economists have largely ignored the issue, perhaps because data on sharing is scarce,
perhaps because simple models suggest individuals will always share at efficient levels, and
perhaps because notions of limitless economic growth reduced interest in economizing on goods.
That is all changing. Online sharing platforms provide new sources of data. Sticky norms and
endogenous preferences can lead to inefficient and unstable equilibria. And slow economic growth
and heightened concerns over climate change have spurred new interest in economizing on goods.
I begin my analysis of the economics of sharing by reviewing the literature on club goods,
household economies, community governance, and decentralized cooperation. James Buchanan’s
theory of clubs highlights the prevalence of shareable goods, but simple neoclassical models naively
suggest that markets will lead individuals to automatically exploit all gains from sharing. Elinor
Ostrom explores how communities can efficiently manage common goods, but community
governance is not an effective means of sharing privately-owned goods. Yochai Benkler celebrates
the power of decentralized sharing, but his enthusiasm warrants a careful economic analysis of the
current and potential gains from sharing.
After reviewing the literature, I present a framework for understanding peer-to-peer
sharing. The economic benefits from sharing stem from the underutilization of private goods. The
costs of sharing are influenced by technology, norms, and preferences. Although online platforms
greatly reduce the cost of matching people with goods, our norms and preferences have not fully
adjusted to this technological change. Over time, I argue that online networks will develop norms
conducive to peer-to-peer sharing and promote preferences for this form of cooperation. The
evolution of our sticky norms and endogenous preferences could lead to a substantial increase in
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sharing in the years to come. My benefit and cost framework also explains why people share
different kinds of goods using different institutions, including libraries, second-hand markets, and
online platforms. I argue that further gains from sharing will likely come from institutions that
facilitate peer-to-peer borrowing and lending.
Next, I describe my data and methodology for estimating the current value and potential
value of decentralized sharing. I use data from the General Social Survey, the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, the NeighborGoods network, and my online survey. I estimate current gains
from sharing by assigning a value to how often people report borrowing and lending items. I
estimate an upper-bound of the potential gains from sharing by calculating household expenditures
on a variety of shareable goods. Although my methods cannot measure the social costs and benefits
of sharing, they shed light on the magnitude of private benefits.
My results suggest that decentralized sharing is currently worth at least $179 dollars a year
to the 30 percent of Americans who borrow an item once a month or more. If new online platforms
succeed in fostering substantial borrowing and lending among strangers, the mean household gains
from sharing could exceed one thousand dollars annually. Significant gains are most likely to come
from sharing tools, media, gear, electronics, toys, pets, vacation homes, and lodging on online
platforms. Households may save the most by effectively sharing privately-owned vehicles.

2.

Literature review

My review of the literature begins within neoclassical economics. Although some researchers
criticize the rationalist, self-interested approaches to understanding sharing (see Belk 2010), I
make the case that decentralized sharing may become increasingly important for rational,
economic actors. Buchanan and Salcedo et al. present models of clubs and households, which
suggest that people always share at efficient levels. However, their models ignore how norms and
preferences determine the costs of sharing, which weakens their argument that equilibria levels of
sharing are efficient or stable. Ostrom argues that individuals may squander common goods, and
that communities can govern such goods efficiently. However, the principles for community
governance are not met in the case of shareable goods. I draw heavily on Benkler’s arguments that
decentralized sharing among loosely-connected individuals is viable, pervasive, and increasingly
important. Benkler draws on Coase’s work on transaction costs, but he overlooks the relevance of
Akerlof’s work on how asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection. My theoretical and
empirical sections build on Benkler’s analysis, while tempering his enthusiasm.
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Buchanan’s groundbreaking 1965 paper, “An Economic Theory of Clubs”, highlights the
pervasiveness of goods that are neither “purely private” nor “purely public” (Buchanan 1965, 1).
“As an extreme example, take a good normally considered to be purely private, say,
a pair of shoes. Clearly your own utility from a single pair of shoes, per unit of time,
depends on the number of other persons who share them with you. Simultaneous
physical sharing may not, of course, be possible; only one person can wear the shoes
at each particular moment. However, for any finite period of time, sharing is
possible, even for such evidently private goods.” (Buchanan 1965, 3)
Buchanan ultimately focuses on goods that are commonly shared through clubs, such as golf
courses, but his analysis also applies to what I call shareable goods. Like club goods, shareable
goods are excludable and fairly non-rival, since people can take turns using them.

Rival
Non-Rival

Table 1. Taxonomy of Goods
Excludable
Non-excludable
private goods
common goods
club goods, shareable goods public goods

Buchanan assumes that clubs accept new members until the benefit of sharing the expense
with the marginal member is offset by the cost of sharing the good with the marginal member
(Buchanan 1965, 5). The cost of sharing can be negative in some domains, due to camaraderie
(Sandler and Tschirhardt 1980). However, in equilibrium it must cost current members something
to share the good with an additional member. (If it did not, a profit-maximizing club would admit
an additional member without reducing the fees paid by current members.) The model suggests
that the market will guide individuals to share some goods efficiently through clubs. It is fairly
straight-forward to generalize Buchanan’s idea to peer-to-peer renting. Rational owners should
rent underutilized goods to their peers whenever the benefit to the borrower – measured in dollars
– exceeds the cost to the lender. From this perspective, the lack of peer-to-peer renting suggests
that gains from sharing are rare.
Alejandrina Salcedo, Todd Schoellman, and Michèle Tertilt’s 2013 paper “Families as
Roommates” makes no reference to Buchanan, but it essentially describes households as clubs. In
their model, people live together if the benefit of splitting the expense of household public goods
outweighs the time cost of “forming and maintaining relationships” with each of their housemates.
(Without such a cost, utility-maximizing individuals would all live in a single, humungous
household.) Salcedo et al. calibrate their model to fit current data from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CES), which shows that people with higher incomes tend to live in smaller households and
4

spend a smaller proportion of their incomes on household public goods. Their calibrated model is
consistent with established household equivalency scales. For example, it suggests that the
household with two median-income adults is 12 percent better off than their single peers earning
the same per-capita income.
Buchanan’s theory of clubs and Salcedo et al.’s theory of households assume that individuals
share goods when the benefits outweigh the costs, which suggests that prevailing levels of sharing
are always efficient. Although their models highlight the costs of sharing, they do not address how
these costs might change. In fact, after calibrating their model using current CES data, Salcedo et al.
argue that income growth explains 37 percent of the decline in the number of adults (and 16
percent of the decline in the number of children) in the average household from 1850 until 2000
(Salcedo et al. 2013, 153). Their claim rests on the heroic assumption that the amount of time it
took to form and maintain relationships with housemates remained constant for one hundred and
fifty years, while the opportunity cost of that time increased with wages. However, it seems likely
that the costs (and benefits) of sharing changed due to technological innovation and the evolution
of norms and preferences. For example, the norms that defined the rights and responsibilities
within multi-generational households may have deteriorated over time. Also, preferences against
living with non-relatives may have developed endogenously, as children increasingly grew up in
single-family households. In short, it is unclear whether prevailing norms and preferences lead
individuals to live in households of the optimal size, as the neoclassical theory suggests. It is
similarly unclear whether individuals engage in the optimal level of inter-household sharing.
Not all economists are so optimistic that individuals will easily form clubs, households, or
other institutions to efficiently share goods. Ostrom argues that enduring institutions for governing
common goods are characterized by seven design principles, including clearly defined boundaries,
established appropriation rules, and collective participation in setting those rules (Ostrom 1990,
90). When these design principles are present, she argues that communities can be the best
institution for allocating common goods; when these principles are absent, community governance
fails. Community governance does not provide a solution for allocating shareable goods, because
these privately-owned items are dispersed and heterogeneous. It is very costly for a community to
set and enforce universal rules governing their use. In decentralized sharing, lenders have greater
freedom to set appropriate rules for sharing a particular good with a particular person, but they
also have fewer resources for enforcing cooperative behavior.
Benkler, a legal scholar, outlines an alternative to Buchanan and Salcedo et al.’s case for
markets and Ostrom’s case for community governance. His 2004 article “Sharing Nicely: On
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Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as Modality of Economic Production,” focuses on
environments in which loosely-connected individuals successfully share goods in a decentralized
manner.
Benkler highlights the system of “slugging” in Northern Virginia, in which drivers pick up
and drop off riders at established locations free of charge. By sharing their rides, “slugs” get a free
commute, and “body snatchers” earn the right to drive in High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes.
Slugging emerged organically when HOV lanes were created in the 1970s. Over time, slugs and
body snatchers have developed norms that reduce the social cost of sharing, including: first come
first served; no talking (unless everyone wants to talk); no payment; no eating; and the slug line
does not leave a single woman standing alone at night (Slugging Etiquette).
Another example of decentralized cooperation is SETI@home, a network of millions of
personal computers that make up the largest virtual supercomputer in the world (Benkler 2004,
291). SETI@home takes large problems related to the search for extraterrestrial life and breaks
them into small parts that can be solved by personal computers. Volunteers contribute to this
project by installing a program on their computers that automatically solves these problems when
the computer is idle.
These case studies illustrate how decentralized sharing can increase the utilization of
private goods – vehicles and computers – at little cost to owners. Benkler contrasts decentralized
sharing with Ostrom’s notion of community governance. He addresses arguments made by Sam
Bowles and Herb Gintis that the community governance works because it provides people with
repeat interactions that improve incentives to cooperate, background knowledge about other
participants, and rules for enforcing cooperative behavior.
“’Community governance’… gains robustness because it involves tightly connected
social groups. But social sharing is a broader phenomenon, one that includes
cooperative enterprises that can be pursued by weakly connected participants or
even by total strangers and yet function as a sustainable and substantial modality of
economic production. Indeed, in the context of the digitally networked
environment, it is this type of sharing and cooperative production among strangers
and weakly connected participants that holds the greatest economic promise”
(Benkler 2004, 333-4).
Benkler stresses the “fluidity” of participation in slugging and SETI@home. These institutions
require a lower level of commitment than community governance. Benkler acknowledges that
these forms of cooperation may be less attractive to “communitarians”, who prefer the forms of
cooperation found in traditional Amish communities or communes. But he contends that this
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fluidity makes these decentralized institutions attractive to “many more people” so that they are
“likely to be more economically effective and efficient on a larger scale” (Benkler 2004, 343).
Benkler’s argument draws heavily on the transaction cost literature spurred by Ronald
Coase. There are costs to both market and non-market sharing. Just as it can be less costly to settle
disputes using informal norms rather than formal laws (Ellickson 1986, 686), it can be less costly
share goods on reciprocal networks rather than peer-to-peer markets (Benkler 2004, 311).
Introducing rental fees for shareable goods may reduce sharing. Bruno Frey and Reto Jegen find
strong evidence that monetary incentives can crowd-out intrinsic motivation to cooperate (Frey
and Jegen 2001, 606). Benkler argues that “social norms may shift around entitlements” to lower
the transaction costs of non-market sharing (Benkler 2004, 311), but it is unclear how much and
how quickly norms can shift.
Benkler overlooks how George Akerlof’s analysis in “The Market for Lemons” relates to
cooperation among loosely-connected individuals (Akerlof 1970). Asymmetric information about
members of sharing networks may lead to problems of adverse selection. Online platforms may
attract uncooperative individuals, who show up late or treat others’ goods carelessly. This could
lead cooperative individuals to lend lower-value goods or simply leave the network. Akerlof’s
insight also provides an argument for why networks may have tipping points. If a network can
attract enough cooperative users that the problem of uncooperative members becomes
insignificant, then even more cooperative individuals may join the network. This process may have
worked in reverse in the case of hitchhiking. When hitchhiking was widespread, the threat of
interacting with dangerous riders or drivers was very low. However, as participation declined and
the problems of adverse selection increased, hitchhiking may have surpassed a tipping point,
leading to its collapse in the United States.
Scholarly research suggests that sharing goods is either trivial or revolutionary. In this
paper I argue that it lies somewhere in between. Next, I present a theoretical framework for
understanding the costs and benefits of sharing gods, followed by an empirical analysis of current
and potential gains from peer-to-peer borrowing and lending

3.

Theory

Within my framework, the economic benefits of sharing stem from the underutilization of shareable
goods, while the costs of sharing are largely social in nature. I stress that the costs and benefits of
sharing depend on norms and preferences. Current levels of sharing may not be efficient if sticky
norms and endogenous preferences prevent people from exploiting new technologies. There are
7

many institutions for increasing the lifetime utilization of shareable goods, but my analysis suggests
that the greatest gains from sharing will come from decentralized borrowing and lending on online
platforms. My framework suggests that the potential value of peer-to-peer sharing could be
economically significant, a proposition I test with my empirical work.
3.1. The economic benefits of sharing
By definition, shareable goods are underutilized. Fully-utilized goods are rival and, hence, private
goods. The utilization of goods varies greatly, even for very similar goods. Recall Buchanan’s
example. Formal shoes are quite shareable, because people wear them only on special occasions.
Casual shoes are not very shareable, because people tend to wear them every day.
The gains from sharing a good depend not on its utilization over any particular time period,
but over its entire lifetime. Some rarely-used goods are fully depreciated by the time they are
discarded. We brush our teeth for a few minutes a day, so we could, in principle, share
toothbrushes (Frank 2010, 576). However, we generally use toothbrushes until they are worn out,
so toothbrushes are not actually underutilized, and there are generally no gains from sharing them
(even if we wanted to).
There is little accurate data on the utilization rates of various goods, but existing data
suggests that the utilization of many goods is quite low. The average power drill is used between
six and twenty minutes ever (Steffen 2007). Assuming that these drills could operate for many
hours, the relevant utilization rate of privately-owned drills may be less than one percent. The
utilization rates of more expensive goods can also be surprisingly low. Average vehicle occupancy
in the United States is 1.7 (Santos et al. 2011, 33), which means the utilization rate is about 33
percent when private vehicles are in use.1 Moreover, private vehicles are driven a bit less than one
hour a day, or 4 percent of the time (Santos et al. 2011, 7, 31). Vehicles would depreciate more
rapidly if they were driven more often, but doubling a vehicle’s annual mileage does not double its
rate of depreciation. The effective lifetime utilization rate of the average privately-owned vehicle
may be 25 percent.
The low utilization rates of many shareable goods suggest there are substantial economic
gains from sharing. Economists recognize the waste of underutilizing stocks of capital and labor, as
measured by capacity utilization and unemployment rates. The underutilization of the stock of
shareable goods represents a similar form of waste. Whether or not it is efficient for people to
rarely use many of the goods they own depends on the costs of sharing.
1

Assuming five-seat cars
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3.2. The costs of sharing
Both Buchanan and Salcedo et al. explicitly recognize the cost of sharing underutilized goods. Some
of the costs of sharing are transaction costs: the time it takes to locate a good, arrange to borrow it,
pick it up, and drop it off. However, the costs of sharing transcend transaction costs and are largely
social in nature. They depend on the level of trust between the borrower and lender, the ability to
punish or discourage malfeasance, the clarity of social scripts around sharing, and the value people
place on privacy, flexibility and independence. Norms and preferences are important determinants
of the cost of sharing.
The key contribution of Buchanan and Salcedo et al. to the economics of sharing is that they
model both the benefits and the costs. The main shortcoming is that they assume that the costs of
sharing are fixed. The internet has substantially reduced the transaction costs associated with
locating a shareable good, but people have not instantaneously joined online platforms to share
goods. If norms are sticky, it will take time for people develop etiquette for peer-to-peer sharing. If
preferences are endogenous, it will take time for people to learn to like sharing on decentralized
networks. I argue that sharing is more complex than simple neoclassical models suggest. My
framework suggests the internet may still lead to fundamental changes in norms and preferences
that sharply reduce the costs of sharing over time.
On the other hand, even if norms and preferences shift over time to facilitate greater
sharing, the gains from sharing are limited. The costs will always outweigh the benefits of sharing
some underutilized goods. Even if the utilization rate of privately-owned drills is 1 percent, it may
be inefficient for one hundred people to share a single drill. However, that does not mean that it is
currently efficient for most households to own a private drill that they use for just a few minutes. In
wealthy countries, people own many items that they use very rarely. A simplistic neoclassical
perspective suggests this must be efficient – why else would they do it? My framework suggests
that this large stock of shareable goods provides an opportunity for people to develop norms and
preferences that will allow them to exploit untapped gains from sharing.
3.3. Institutions for sharing
Online platforms are just some of the many institutions people use to exploit gains from sharing. I
classify these institutions along three dimensions:


Institutions for transferring ownership and institutions for lending and borrowing



Institutions for centralized sharing and institutions for decentralized sharing
9



Institutions for market sharing and institutions for non-market sharing

Common forms of sharing can be organized in a 2∗2∗2 matrix. Table 2 provides examples of all
eight types of institutions, with those that facilitate decentralized borrowing and lending in bold.
My analysis of the costs and benefits of sharing provides some insight for why people tend to
choose different institutions for sharing different goods in different contexts. The framework also
explains why the greatest untapped gains from sharing are likely in decentralized borrowing and
lending.
Table 2. Methods of Sharing
Transferring ownership
Borrowing and lending
Centralized
Decentralized
Centralized
Decentralized
Market

thrift stores,
pawn shops

high-end garage
sales, Craigslist,
EBay, Amazon

Tool rental
stores Zipcar,
Netflix,
renttherunway

RelayRides,
Airbnb,
Blablacar

Nonmarket

free stores,
clothing
swaps,
homemade
stuff swaps?

low-end garage
sales, passing on
clothing,
Freecycle,
“borrowing” a
cup of sugar

public
libraries,
households,
communes

sharing with
friends and
neighbors,
slugging,
SETI@home,
Couchsurfing,
NeighborGoods

People transfer ownership over some goods while they borrow and lend others. We avoid
borrowing and lending goods when it is prohibitively costly to haul the good back and forth. In
general, bulky and frequently-used goods, including furniture and clothing, tend to be sold or gifted,
whereas portable and rarely-used items, such as books and drills, tend to be borrowed. In settings
with limited trust, it may be preferable for people to transfer full ownership (and residual
claimancy) of fragile goods to their new owners, rather than borrow and lend them. The internet
has especially reduced the transaction cost of borrowing and lending goods, which require many
more transactions than transferring ownership. Online platforms also provide new, if imperfect,
mechanisms for building trust among loosely-connected individuals.
Some sharing is centralized, while some sharing is decentralized. Centralized sharing has
the advantage of reducing some of the costs of finding a particular good. Institutions that lend out
goods also have clear rules that ensure borrowers return items in good condition and protect the
institution from liability. However, there are distinct advantages to decentralized sharing. When
sharing is decentralized, people may not have to travel as far to borrow a good – it is usually
10

preferable to borrow a ladder from a neighbor than a rental store. By increasing the utilization of
privately-owned goods, decentralized sharing avoids the cost of storing shareable goods. I focus on
decentralized sharing, because new technology particularly facilitates peer-to-peer transactions by
centralizing information about where goods can be found.
Finally, people share some goods through the market, while they share others at no cost. It
is not entirely clear why people often avoid sharing goods on markets. In some cases, the marketclearing price or rental rate may be close to zero (Thomas 2003). In others, the cost of setting
rental rates and prices may lead people to share goods for free. Exchanging money may crowd-out
intrinsic motivations to share goods (Willer et al. 2012). Lending goods for free may also
encourage borrowers to treat goods more carefully than they would a rented good, increasing the
total gains from sharing. However, rental fees may be key to getting people to borrow and lend
valuable goods. This paper’s focus on decentralized borrowing and lending includes both market
and non-market sharing.
The internet has improved many established institutions for sharing, including libraries, car
rental companies, and second-hand markets. But the internet particularly opens up opportunities
for decentralized borrowing and lending. The cost of coordinating convenient, reliable, safe, peerto-peer transactions is declining. The question is whether these new institutions promote norms
and preferences that are conducive to borrowing and lending goods on online platforms.
3.4. The sharing economy
A recent surge in websites aim to facilitate decentralized borrowing and lending. Couchsurfing
matches guests with hosts. NeighborGoods lets people share underutilized tools, media, and gear.
RelayRides facilitates peer-to-peer car rental. The mixed success of these sites provides some
support to Benkler’s 2004 claim that sharing will become increasingly important in the “digitally
networked” economy. It remains to be seen to what extent these platforms can shift norms and
preferences to radically increase sharing.
Not all companies associated with the sharing economy aim to increase the utilization of
shareable goods. For example, Lyft provides an unregulated taxi service and TaskRabbit an
informal labor market. It is also worth noting that, although there are both market and non-market
platforms for sharing goods, there are few non-market sites for people to share services without
receiving anything in exchange. A survey of users of the Finnish sharing platform, Kassi, found that
people were much more eager to share their stuff than share their time (Suhonen et al. 2010, 9).
This may be because people’s time is generally more rival than their shareable goods.
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The goal of sharing platforms like CouchSurfing, NeighborGoods, and RelayRides is to
facilitate better matches between borrowers and lenders than offline networks of friends,
neighbors, and relatives. They aim to get users exactly what they need, precisely when they need it,
as conveniently as possible. Online sharing platforms facilitate borrowing and lending in three
ways: they organize information about what goods members would like to share, they provide
feedback mechanisms that encourage cooperative behavior, and they strengthen preferences for
sharing. Organizing information for decentralized borrowing and lending is useful even for sharing
among friends, relatives, and neighbors, since it is prohibitively costly to continually inform
acquaintances of all items one would like to borrow or lend. Allowing people to leave feedback on
the actions of others, and strengthening preferences for borrowing and lending goods, are essential
for decentralized sharing among loosely-connected individuals.
Consider how NeighborGoods and Couchsurfing encourage people to share durable goods
and lodging with strangers. Members of NeighborGoods post items they would like to share to their
inventories and search the local inventories for items they would like to borrow. When members
cannot find an item they would like to borrow, they can post it to their wishlist. If someone
requests to borrow a certain good, and the lender agrees, NeighborGoods asks the borrower to
provide his or her telephone number, describe how he or she would like to use the good, and agree
to follow the “three golden rules of sharing: play nice, treat other people’s stuff the way you’d want
your stuff to be treated, and show up on time.” The pair then arranges for the borrower to pick up
and drop off the good at a convenient time and place. When the transaction is complete,
NeighborGoods asks the lender to rate and comment on the borrower, and the borrower to rate and
comment on both the lender and the item. In cases of malicious behavior, members can place a
“panic” on alleged offenders, and NeighborGoods retains the right to permanently remove bad
actors from its site. (Of course, the site has no way of preventing offenders from setting up another
account under a different username).
Couchsurfing similarly organizes information and enforces cooperation to facilitate sharing.
In their 2009 paper, “Surfing a Web of Trust”, Lauterbach, Truong, Shah, and Adamic analyze
anonymous, individual-level data from Couchsurfing. General reciprocity is vital to Couchsurfing,
since direct reciprocity is only possible if two members travel to each other’s home cities – an
unlikely coincidence of wants. However, Lauterbach et al. find that 12 to 18 percent of
Couchsurfing stays were directly reciprocated between 2004 and 2008, suggesting that
Couchsurfing experiences can lead to new friendships (Lauterbach et al. 2009, 348).
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These online sharing platforms recognize that the costs and benefits of sharing depend
critically on sticky norms and endogenous preferences. They promote norms that are conducive to
sharing among loosely-connected individuals, such as NeighborGoods’ three golden rules
encouraging borrowers to be friendly, careful, and punctual. They also encourage people to
recognize the endogeneity of preferences. Couchsurfing tells new users, “You have friends all over
the world, you just haven’t met them yet” (Couchsurfing, How It Works). Friendship is, in a sense,
the ultimate endogenous preference. Online sharing platforms have not maximized the benefits or
minimized the costs of decentralized sharing, but the plethora of sites ensures steady
experimentation as platforms compete for users. This competition is not entirely zero-sum.
Promoting cooperative norms and sharing preferences benefits all platforms in the sharing
economy.
My framework suggests that the internet may not only reduce the transaction costs of
borrowing and lending, but also shift norms and preferences to substantially increase decentralized
sharing. Like Benkler, I am optimistic about the prospect of substantially greater sharing in the
digital economy. However, theory alone cannot address how economically important decentralized
borrowing and lending is today or will be in the future.

4.

Data and Methodology

This paper seeks to answer two key empirical questions: How large are the current gains from
decentralized sharing? And what are the potential gains from peer-to-peer sharing on online
platforms? Data on sharing are limited, leading Benkler to refer to it as the “dark matter of the
economic production universe” (Benkler 2004, 337). I draw on four sources: the General Social
Survey (GSS), the NeighborGoods network, my own survey, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CES). All these data have significant limitations. None offers good measures of the social costs (or
benefits) of sharing, so my empirical work focuses on the economic benefits of sharing.
The GSS provides self-reported data on sharing with people in other households. The
survey’s 2002 and 2004 topical modules on altruism ask respondents how often they performed
nine altruistic acts, including how often they “let someone [they] didn’t know very well borrow an
item of some value like dishes.” I pool data from the 2002 and 2004 surveys for a sample of 2,712
people, and I convert the categorical values like “once a month” and “two or three times a year” to
annual values following Einolf (2007). Unfortunately, the GSS only asks people how often they
share items with someone they don’t know very well, whereas most decentralized borrowing and
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lending occurs largely within reciprocal networks of friends, neighbors, and relatives. The GSS
question misses these transactions.
To address this shortcoming of the GSS question, I designed and conducted my own online
survey of NeighborGoods users. My survey consists of eighteen questions and takes about ten
minutes to complete. Respondents had a one-in-fifty chance of winning a $100 Amazon gift card “to
purchase something you (and your neighbors) need”. I ask how often subjects borrow and lend
items with people they know well and with people they don’t know well. The survey asks users
about their motivations and obstacles to sharing goods online. I also collect data on individual and
household characteristics. The full survey is in Appendix A. NeighborGoods emailed a link to the
survey to 22,000 active and inactive members in August 2013, and 333 people completed the
survey, giving me a response rate of 1.5 percent. Although this response rate is low, it is common
for surveys of large online communities. For example, Willer et al.’s survey of 47,492 Freecycle
users achieved a response rate of 1.7 percent (Willer et al. 2012, Appendix A).

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of GSS and NeighborGoods samples
Obs

GSS sample
Mean
Min

NeighborGoods sample
Mean
Min
Max

Max

Obs

0

1

324

0.45

0

1

18

89

319

41.6

20

81

1

11

323

2.60

1

5

59,243

449

204,320

306

84,412

10,000

150,000

2.22

1

3

325

2.22

1

3

Variable
Gender

2,712

0.51

Age

2,700

44.7

Household size

2,712

2.74

Household income

2,398

Happiness

2,706

Variables definitions: gender (male = 0, female = 1), household size ("5 or more" = 5 for NG sample),
household income (based on midpoints, in 2013 dollars), happiness (1 = "not too happy", 2 = "pretty
happy", 3 = "very happy"). GSS means are weighted, NeighborGoods means are unweighted.

The NeighborGoods sample is quite similar to the GSS sample. Respondents to my survey
include slightly more men, are slightly younger, and live in slightly smaller households, as shown in
Table 3. Respondents from the two surveys report nearly identical levels of happiness. The most
significant discrepancy between the two samples is that my subjects report a mean household
income that is 42 percent larger than GSS respondents. My sample comes disproportionately from
wealthier Pacific states (NeighborGoods was launched in California), but re-weighting the sample to
reflect the actual regional distribution of the US reduces the income discrepancy by just 1 percent.
Part of the income difference may result from how I code the category “$100,000 or more”. Recoding the income category $120,000 instead of $150,000 reduces the discrepancy by about a third.
I am forced to conclude that my sample is more affluent than the American population at large. I
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suspect that is because people with higher incomes and higher levels of education use the internet
more extensively, making them more likely to join NeighborGoods and respond to my online
survey.
My survey provides better data on how frequently people borrow and lend goods with
people they do know well, but it does not ask respondents to report their gains from sharing each
time they borrow a good. Instead, I estimate the average gains from sharing when people borrow
items for free using anonymous data from NeighborGoods. I use activity logs from March 2009 to
November 2012 that provide information about 14,937 items and 1,281 transactions over this time
period. When users add an item to their inventory, NeighborGoods asks them to list its value.
Table 4 lists the median and mean value of goods that are posted and goods that are shared. I
assume that the items people share on NeighborGoods are similar to the items that people share
offline. If anything, the median good shared among their friends, relatives, and neighbors is
probably worth more than the typical good shared on NeighborGoods.
Table 4. Value of items on NeighborGoods
Obs

Median value

Mean value

Posted goods

14,863

$60

$214

Shared goods

1,243

$75

$466

The next step is to translate the value of a good into the value of borrowing that good.
Economists have lots of data on how much goods cost, but not much data on how much it is worth
to use a good for an hour, a day, or a week. Rental markets are very thin for most of the goods that
people share with one another, so they do not provide a good measure of the value of borrowing a
good for a day. My survey provides a measure of the value of borrowing goods. It asks users if they
would “consider sharing more expensive items on NeighborGoods if lenders could charge a fee.”
Many users worry that allowing fees would undermine the cooperative spirit of the network, but 55
percent of respondents are amenable to the idea. The survey asks those users to list specific goods
they would be willing to borrow or lend for a fee, how much the goods are worth, and what rental
fees they would be willing to pay or accept. Borrowers and lenders have very similar ideas about
the value of sharing. It is worth more to share valuable goods, but the proposed rental/asset price
ratios decline as the value of the good increases. The scatter plot in Figure 1 shows the actual
rental/asset price ratios that respondents would pay as borrowers and accept as lenders. I use a
local polynomial estimator to estimate the rental/asset price ratio for goods of any value. This
method allows for a non-linear relationship between the variables, and it provides good estimates
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of the ratios near the endpoints. My predicted ratios suggest that people are willing to pay 9.4
percent of the asset price to borrow an item worth $50, 5.8 percent to borrow an item worth $500,
and 1.9 percent to borrow an item worth $5,000. Lenders are willing to loan goods at very similar
rates, as shown in Figure 1.

0

.05

.1

.15

.2

Figure 1: Actual and predicted rental/asset price ratios

2

4

6
8
ln(asset price)

lenders actual ratios
borrowers actual ratios

10

12

lenders predicted ratios
borrowers predicted ratios

Predicted rental/asset price ratios are estimated using a local polynomial estimator.

Rental companies often lend goods at significantly higher rental rates, which is one reason
why rental markets for most shareable goods are quite small. For example, bike shops typically
rent $300 to $500 bicycles for $30 to $50 a day (Citibike Resources), so the rental/asset price ratio
is about 10 percent, almost twice the 5.8 to 6.4 percent that most people are willing to pay to
borrow a good of that value. The gap between the ratio rental companies charge and the ratio most
individuals are willing to pay and accept represents the gains from decentralized borrowing and
lending.2 I use the predicted rental/asset price ratios from the polynomial regression to assign a
2

Many cities have recently implemented bike-sharing programs that are transforming the bicycle rental market. For

example, the New York City bike share program now offers access to 6,000 bikes at hundreds of stations in Manhattan
and Brooklyn. Citibike does not compete directly with shops on daily rentals. It is focused instead on providing shorter
term bike rentals to facilitate commutes. For $95 a year, members borrow a bike for an unlimited number of 45 minute
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value to goods actually shared on NeighborGoods. I estimate that the mean benefit of a good
borrowed on NeighborGoods in my sample is $14.88. I use this estimate to assign a monetary value
to self-reported peer-to-peer sharing in both the GSS and my own survey. My results are discussed
in the following section.
The last task of my paper is to estimate the potential value of decentralized sharing. Most
online platforms have achieved limited success so far in facilitating sharing among looselyconnected individuals. It is not yet clear how many additional transactions these platforms will
facilitate, or whether they will be more successfully in getting people to share cheap or expensive
goods. This makes it impossible to estimate the potential value of decentralized sharing in the same
way I estimate the current value.
Instead, I use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) to calculate how much households
spend on different categories of shareable goods. I measure expenditures on shareable goods in the
same way Salcedo et al. measure expenditures on household public goods. I first determine which
Universal Classification Codes (UCCs) represent spending on the sort of goods that are most
commonly shared on general sharing platforms, such as tools, media, gear, electronics, and toys.
This leaves out items which are occasionally shared on general platforms, and more often shared on
specialized platforms, such as vacation homes, lodging, private vehicles, and pets. My classification
of 490 UCCs into six categories of shareable goods is listed in Appendix B.
Current spending on shareable goods provides an imperfect upper-bound for the potential
value of sharing. First, the measure ignores any social costs or benefits from sharing. Even if
decentralized sharing becomes routine, households cannot eliminate their expenditures on
shareable goods, because sharing is limited by the utilization of shareable goods. On the other
hand, not all gains from sharing will come from people borrowing items they would otherwise have
purchased; some gains will come from people borrowing items they would have foregone.
Nevertheless, household expenditures on shareable goods provide a useful upper-bound on the
potential gains from sharing, especially for advocates who suggest that the gains from sharing are
very large. The CES also provides some information about which categories of goods promise the
greatest gains from sharing.

trips. However, if the length of the trip exceeds 45 minutes, the program charges members $2.50 for the next 30 minutes,
and $9.00 for each additional 30 minutes. The daily rental/asset price ratio for Citibike would be much higher than that
offered by bike shops or decentralized lenders. However, for short-term rentals, the ratio is much lower.
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5.

Results

Self-reported data from the GSS and my survey suggest that the current gains from sharing are at
least $179 a year for 30 percent of Americans and at least $774 for 8 percent of Americans. Data
from the CES shows households spend an average of $9,090 a year on shareable goods, which
suggests that the potential savings from greater decentralized sharing are limited but significant.
By far, the largest gains from sharing would probably come from greater utilization of privatelyowned vehicles.
5.1. The current value of decentralized sharing
According to the GSS, 7 percent of Americans report lending an item of some value to someone they
“didn’t know very well” once a month or more. By comparison, 8 percent of my survey respondents
report lending items to people they didn’t know well once a month or more. This, along with the
evidence presented in Table 3, suggests that my sample of NeighborGoods users is fairly
representative of the US population at large, at least in respect to how often they share goods.
Respondents to my survey report sharing with people they know well about five times as often as
they report sharing with people they did not know well. Table 5 shows that 35 percent report
lending items to people they know well, and 29 percent report borrowing items from people they
know well, at least once a month.

Table 5. Frequency of sharing

More than once a week

GSS sample
lend to
someone you
didn't know
well
29
1%

lend to
someone you
didn't know
well
2
1%

NeighborGoods Sample
borrow from
lend to
someone you
someone you didn't know
knew well
well
18
5%
1
0%

borrow from
someone you
knew well
8
2%

Once a week

39

1%

6

2%

27

8%

3

1%

16

5%

Once a month
At least 2 to 3 times in
the past year
Once in the past year

128

5%

15

5%

71

22%

14

4%

71

22%

474

18%

41

12%

109

33%

29

9%

90

28%

464

17%

66

20%

30

9%

60

19%

52

16%

Not at all in the past year

1553

58%

199

60%

74

22%

217

67%

89

27%

Total

2687

100%

329

100%

329

100%

324

100%

326

100%

Self-reported data is imperfect. First, the wording of the questions probably misses
occasions when people share some valuable goods, such as car trips or lodging. Second, the
question asks how often individuals borrow and lend goods, so it misses borrowing and lending by
other members of the individuals’ household. Third, people report lending items slightly more
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often than borrowing items. While it is possible that respondents to my survey genuinely lend
goods more often than they borrow them, it seems likely that they mildly exaggerate how often they
lend goods or how seldom they borrow goods.3 These three shortcomings of the data may
downwardly bias my estimates of households’ gains from sharing.
My survey suggests that current levels of peer-to-peer sharing are economically significant
for some Americans. If the average gain from sharing is $14.88, then borrowing goods is worth at
least $179 annually to 30 percent of people, and it is worth at least $774 annually to 8 percent of
people. On average, respondents report borrowing 9.5 items a year and lending 14.3 items a year,
which imply mean gains from sharing are $141 and $213 respectively. My estimates suggest that
sharing goods is an important component of non-market cooperation. Compare the value of
borrowing and lending goods to the value of time spent helping non-household children, helping
non-household adults, and volunteering. The American Time Use Survey reports how much time
people spend on each of these activities. I then value these forms of non-market work at $10 per
hour, which is somewhat higher than Nancy Folbre’s lower-bound valuation of childcare time
(Folbre 2008, 121-135) and consistent with Woods Bowman’s analysis of the value of volunteer
time (Bowman 2009). Table 6 compares the value of sharing goods with the value of helping nonhousehold members and formal volunteering. Gains from sharing are not quite as important as the
time people spend helping each other outside the market, but they are an important form of
cooperation.
Table 6. The value of sharing goods, helping non-household members,
and formal volunteering
mean incidents
per year

mean minutes
per day

annual value*

borrowing goods

9.5

$141

lending goods

14.3

$213

helping non-hh kids

4.5

$272

helping non-hh adults

5.2

$316

formal volunteering
9.7
$588
*I assume that the mean value of sharing a good is $14.88 and that non-market work
is worth $10 an hour.
Source: My survey and ATUS 2003-2012 sample means using person/day weights

The data does suggest that decentralized sharing is fairly reciprocal. The correlation between annualized measures
estimates of lending to anyone and borrowing from anyone is 0.58.
3
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The internet currently facilitates a very small fraction of decentralized borrowing and
lending. Among my survey respondents, all of whom are members of NeighborGoods, less than one
percent of sharing occurs on that network. However, my survey results suggest that online
platforms have potential. I ask users, “What are your main reasons for not borrowing more items
on NeighborGoods?” Only 12 percent of respondents responded that one obstacle is, “I am
uncomfortable borrowing items from people I don’t know.” By contrast, 66 percent of users say, “I
forget to check NeighborGoods’ inventory when I need something.” It may take time and practice
for people’s norms and preferences to adapt to new online methods for sharing. My survey also
finds that 72 percent of respondents think, “There are not enough NeighborGoods users in my
area.” This suggests that a fundamental challenge for online platforms is to build a critical mass of
users in order to match borrowers with lenders as well as offline networks.
I conclude that the current value of peer-to-peer sharing is economically significant, but
moderate, for some Americans. Specifically, I estimate that it is worth at least $179 annually to 30
percent of Americans and at least $774 annually to 8 percent of Americans. Although
NeighborGoods facilitates a small percentage of transaction among my survey respondents, online
platforms may be more successful as they mold norms and preferences and attract a critical mass of
users in local areas.
5.1. The potential value of decentralized sharing
The next task for this paper is to estimate the potential gains from sharing, if platforms are able to
facilitate high levels of sharing between strangers. I do this by calculating households’ expenditures
on different categories of shareable goods. As noted in Section 4, this does not provide an exact
estimate of the potential gains from sharing, but it does provide an upper bound on the amount of
money households could save from borrowing, rather than purchasing, different types of shareable
goods. The exercise also sheds some light on what categories of goods may offer the largest gains
from sharing.
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) reports that households spend an average of $820
a year on tools, media, gear, electronics, toys and other goods that are typical of the items shared on
platforms like NeighborGoods, Sharetribe, and Acts of Sharing. If these goods are highly
underutilized, and if the social costs of sharing are zero, then households could save no more than
$820 a year by borrowing these goods instead of purchasing them. It is unclear what the gains of
sharing are given actual utilization rates and social costs. It may nevertheless be helpful for
proponents and designers of platforms to recognize that households spend a limited amount of
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money on the tools, media, gear, electronics, and toys that often clutter our homes. The largest
gains from sharing may lie elsewhere.
Members of NeighborGoods, Sharetribe, and Acts of Sharing occasionally borrow and lend
other types of goods, including pets, vacation homes, lodging, and private vehicles. Table 7 lists
households’ mean annual expenditure on each category of these goods, as well as platforms
designed specifically for sharing these goods. On average, households spend $9,090 each year on
all types of shareable goods. It is unclear exactly how this upper bound translates into potential
gains from sharing. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that, if decentralized borrowing and
lending becomes common, the average households’ gains from sharing could exceed one thousand
dollars annually.

Table 7. Household expenditures on shareable goods
Categories of spending

Mean annual
expenditures

Tools, media, gear, etc.

$820

Pets
Vacation homes
Lodging away from home

Peer-to-peer markets

$286

Sharing networks
NeighborGoods, Acts of
Sharing, Sharetribe
Spotwag

$289

HomeExchange

Airbnb

$298

CouchSurfing

Airbnb
Carpooling.com,
Wheelz, RelayRides,
Zimride,

Private vehicles (fixed costs)

$3,994

Private vehicles (variable costs)

$3,403

All shareable goods

$9,090

Sharetribe, Acts of
Sharing

Snapgoods
NA

Source: Consumer Expenditure Public Use Microdata 2011 using household weights.

Pets offer a particularly striking example of the potential gains from sharing. The cover of
The Economist’s 2013 issue depicts a “sharing economy” household renting its lawnmower for $6 a
day, its surfboard for $80 a week, and its dog for $5 a walk. The dog stands out as the only good for
which it seems just as plausible for the “borrower” to charge the “lender” as vice versa. Many pet
owners would like help looking after their pets, especially when they are out of town. Meanwhile,
many people who do not own pets would like some animal company without the full-time
responsibility of being a pet owner. There are clearly gains from sharing pets, even if is unclear
who should pay whom. Spotwag’s solution to this problem is to set the price at zero, providing pet
owners with free pet sitters, and non-owners with free pet rentals.
Table 7 shows that, by far, the largest potential gains from sharing are in transportation.
Households spend an average of $7,397 a year on the fixed and variable costs associated with
private vehicles. While car rental companies and taxi services provide centralized means for
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sharing vehicles, annual household expenditures on car rentals and taxis are just $31 and $28
respectively. A slew of companies are attempting to facilitate greater peer-to-peer sharing. Zimride
and Carpooling.com promote ride-sharing, by matching drivers and riders, providing feedback
mechanisms, and helping drivers charge riders a clear fee. RelayRides and Wheelz use similar tools
to create an online marketplace for peer-to-peer car rentals. It is not yet clear how successful these
companies will be, but some households could probably save over a thousand dollars a year by
actively sharing vehicles with peers. In this case, there are external benefits too: ridesharing and
carsharing reduce demand for parking; ridesharing also reduces pollution and congestion (Gorenflo
& Eskandari-Qajar 2013).
The average US household spends $9,090 a year on shareable goods that some people
already borrow and lend using online platforms. This figure provides an upper bound on the
potential savings from decentralized sharing, and it leads me to conclude that peer-to-peer sharing
could provide over one thousand dollars in value for the typical American household. The
economic gains from sharing are not limitless, as some proponents suggest, but they are significant
– particularly in the context of stagnating incomes.

6.

Conclusion

Economic theory recognizes both the costs and the benefits of sharing. However, these costs and
benefits are not set in stone. They depend not only on technology, but also on norms and
preferences that are susceptible to change. This leads me to reject the notion that current levels of
sharing are necessarily efficient and argue that decentralized borrowing and lending could become
much more important in the digital economy. From this perspective, I estimate the current and
potential value of peer-to-peer sharing. If online sharing platforms are successful, that suggests
that the average household’s gains from sharing could exceed a thousand dollars annually. The
largest gains arise from greater utilization of the massive fleet of privately-owned vehicles in the
US.
The sharing economy is fertile ground for future economic research. One goal would be to
improve upon my estimates of the value of decentralized sharing. More detailed surveys might ask
subjects to list the items they share with family, friends, and neighbors. They may also place a value
on carpooling and hosting guests. Qualitative research may also shed greater light on the social
costs and benefits of sharing goods.
Other research might address why some people share more than others. There is some
evidence that people with lower market incomes engage in greater non-market cooperation. It is
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not yet clear whether poor people borrow and lend goods more often than their affluent peers.
However, further research on who shares may shed light on how sharing acts as a complement and
a substitute to market provisioning.
Researchers would also benefit from a deeper understanding of the returns to scale on a
variety of sharing platforms. My survey reveals a widespread belief that that the greatest challenge
facing some platforms is building a critical mass of users. While there are many reasons to expect
significant returns to scale on these platforms, there is no data that shows this to be the case.
Economists should estimate matching functions for sharing platforms similar to those they estimate
for labor markets. These matching functions will vary greatly across platforms. For example,
Couchsurfing helps people find hosts around the world, whereas NeighborGoods helps people find
durable goods around the block. Describing these returns to scale may give designers of platforms
a better idea of how to build a successful platform.
Future research might also address the possible environmental benefits of online platforms.
My survey indicates that “reducing waste” is the most common motivation for participating on
NeighborGoods. The internet has produced a number of institutions for sharing goods, including
Craigslist, eBay, and Freecycle. National data from the EPA shows that per-capita municipal solid
waste (MSW) grew steadily until 2000, when it peaked at 4.7 pounds per person per day, and then
began a slow decline. Careful analysis might reveal whether new institutions for sharing goods
played a role in this reduction in waste and, if so, how to build on that success it in the future.
Finally, the sharing economy opens up new opportunities to test hypotheses from
behavioral economics in non-experimental settings. Big data could allow researchers to address a
number of fundamental questions. How do people cooperate? Do they reward individuals who
cooperate by sharing nicely? Do they punish bad actors? Do they reciprocate directly or indirectly
after borrowing a good? The growth of sharing platforms may not only improve households’
standard of living and reduce waste, but also provide new opportunities for researchers to observe
a wide range of economic interactions.
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Appendix B
Percent
of total
expenditures

UCC

UCC description

Category of shareable good

470111
500110
450210
460110
460901
450110

Gasoline
Vehicle insurance
New trucks or vans (net outlay)
Used cars (net outlay)
Used trucks or vans (net outlay)
New cars (net outlay)
Lodging away from home away from home on
trips
Tires (new, used or recapped); replacement and
mounting of tires, including tube replacement
Pets, pet supplies and medicine for Pets
Same as 220211 - owned vacation home, vacation
coops
Gasoline on out-of-town trips
Toys, games, arts, crafts, tricycles, and battery
powered riders
Truck or van finance charges
Vehicle registration state/local
Veterinarian expenses for Pets
Basic lease charge (car lease)
Automobile finance charges
Same as 220311 - owned vacation home; vacation
coops
Lubrication and oil changes
Motor repair and replacement
School books, supplies, and equipment for college
Brake work
Basic lease charge (truck/van lease)
Motor tune-up

Private vehicles (variable costs)
Private vehicles (fixed costs)
Private vehicles (fixed costs)
Private vehicles (fixed costs)
Private vehicles (fixed costs)
Private vehicles (fixed costs)

6.675
2.432
1.952
1.795
1.759
1.747

Lodging away from home

0.833

Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.402

Pets

0.398

Vacation homes

0.357

Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.350

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.331

Private vehicles (variable costs)
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Pets
Private vehicles (fixed costs)
Private vehicles (fixed costs)

0.315
0.304
0.299
0.265
0.265

Vacation homes

0.241

Private vehicles (variable costs)
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.212
0.183
0.177
0.169
0.162
0.147

Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.142

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.128
0.125
0.125

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.124

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.117

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.108

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.101

Private vehicles (variable costs)
Pets

0.099
0.097

210210
480110
610320
220212
470113
610110
510901
520110
620420
450310
510110
220312
490312
490413
660110
490221
450410
490311
490318
590230
480213
470112
320410
590310
670902
600122
490211
620410

Repair tires and miscellaneous repair work, such
as battery charge, wash, wax, repair and
replacement of windshield wiper, wiper motor,
heater, air conditioner, radio and antenna
Books not through book clubs
Vehicle parts, equipment, and accessories
Diesel fuel
Lawnmowing equipment and other yard
machinery
Magazine or newspaper subscription
Rentals of books and equipment, and other
school-related expenses
Trailer-type or other attachable-type camper (net
outlay)
Clutch and transmission repair
Pet services
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520531
490412
230152
610230
490110
310220
320521
460902
600420
490231
450220
490232
520512
490313
600310
620912
310231
320420
320511
310232
310230
260113
490900
230902
490411
310314
590410
490319
220122
310340
520410
320150
600132
470211
310210
310320
320522
320370
520310
480212
340901

Parking fees at garages, meters, and lots excl. fees
that are costs of property ownership
Electrical system repair
Repair and remodeling services (owned vacation)
Photographic equipment
Body work, painting, repair and replacement of
upholstery, vinyl/convertible top, and glass,
installation of carpet
Video cassettes, tapes, and discs
Small electrical kitchen appliances
Used motorcycles, motor scooters, or mopeds
(net outlay)
Hunting and fishing equipment
Steering or front end repair
New motorcycles, motor scooters, or mopeds (net
outlay)
Cooling system repair
Auto rental on out-of-town trips
Front end alignment, wheel balance and rotation
Bicycles
Rental of video cassettes, tapes, and discs
Video game software
Power tools
Electric floor cleaning equipment
Video game hardware/accessories
Video and computer game hardware and
software
Same as 260112 - owned vacation home; vacation
condos and coops
Auto repair service policy
Same as 230901 - owned vacation home; vacation
condos and coops
Exhaust system repair
Digital audio players
Magazine or newspaper, single copy
Vehicle air conditioner repair
Same as 220121 - owned vacation home, vacation
coops
Records, CDs, audio tapes
Vehicle inspection
Barbeque grills and outdoor equipment
Boat with motor (net outlay)
Motor oil
VCR''s and video disc players
Sound components, component systems, and
compact disc sound systems
Portable heating and cooling equipment
Non-electric cookware
Driver?s license
Vehicle products and services
Rental or repair of equipment and other yard
machinery, power and non-power tools

Private vehicles (fixed costs)

0.095

Private vehicles (variable costs)
Vacation homes
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.084
0.080
0.080

Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.075

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.073
0.073

Private vehicles (fixed costs)

0.070

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.069
0.063

Private vehicles (fixed costs)

0.063

Private vehicles (variable costs)
rentalvehicles
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.061
0.059
0.054
0.053
0.051
0.051
0.044
0.044
0.044

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.043

Vacation homes

0.040

Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.039

Vacation homes

0.037

Private vehicles (variable costs)
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.036
0.036
0.035
0.035

Vacation homes

0.035

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.034
0.033
0.033
0.030
0.029
0.028

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.028

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (fixed costs)
Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.027
0.027
0.025
0.024

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.023
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490212
450313
520511
430130
320320
520532
320130
600410
600430
600121
600902
450413
320902
490314
210902
250213
620919
470220
520550
600901
270413
520542
270213
450414
260213
590220
520522
260114
510902
320310
320340
320512
310311
480214
520521
230142
620904
880310
340907
520560
320360

Drive shaft and rear-end repair
Cash down payment (car lease)
Auto rental, excl. trips
Travel items, including luggage, and luggage
carriers
China and other dinnerware
Parking fees on out-of-town trips
Infants? equipment
Camping equipment
Winter sports equipment
Boat without motor or non camper-type trailer,
such as for boat or cycle (net outlay)
Other sports equipment
Cash down payment (truck/van lease)
Non-power tools
Shock absorber replacement
Ground rent - owned vacation home
Gas, bottled or tank - owned vacation home
Rental of other vehicles on out-of-town trips
Coolant/antifreeze, brake - transmission fluids,
additives, and radiator/cooling system protectant
(not purchased with tune-up)
Towing charges (excl. contracted or pre-paid)
Water sports equipment
Same as 270412 - owned vacation home; vacation
condos and coops
Tolls on out-of-town trips
Same as 270212 - owned vacation home; vacation
condos and coops
Termination fee (truck/van lease)
Same as 260212 - owned vacation home; vacation
condos and coops
Books through book clubs
Truck or van rental on out-of-town trips
Electricity - rented vacation property
Motorcycle finance charges
Plastic dinnerware
Glassware
Sewing machines
Radio
Vehicle audio equipment excluding labor
Truck or van rental, excl. trips
Same as 230141 - owned home and vacation
home
Rental and repair of musical instruments,
supplies, and accessories (now includes pianos)
Interest on line of credit home equity loan owned vacation home
Rental and installation of household equipment see 300111-300332
Global positioning services
Serving pieces other than silver

Private vehicles (variable costs)
Private vehicles (fixed costs)
rentalvehicles

0.023
0.021
0.020

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.019

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.018
0.017
0.017
0.017
0.017

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.016

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (fixed costs)
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Vacation homes
Vacation homes
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015
0.014
0.014
0.013

Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.013

Private vehicles (variable costs)
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.012
0.012

Vacation homes

0.012

Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.012

Vacation homes

0.011

Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.009

Vacation homes

0.009

Tools, media, gear, etc.
rentalvehicles
Vacation homes
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (variable costs)
rentalvehicles

0.009
0.009
0.008
0.008
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.006
0.006

Vacation homes

0.005

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.005

Vacation homes

0.005

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.005

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.005
0.004
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440140
390902
380903
450314
480215
470212
250113
420120
370902
340908
230123
660310
660410
360902
620905
520907
310313
220314
660901
600110
340902
240323
240313
220902
340905
320350
270414
620918
620917
240113
620916
620906
520904
320623
270903
240123
240223
--

Clothing rental
Girls? other clothing, incl. costumes
Women?s other clothing, incl. costumes
Termination fee (car lease)
Vehicle video equipment
Motor oil on out-of-town trips
Same as 250112 - owned vacation home; vacation
condos and coops
Sewing notions, patterns
Boys? other clothing, incl. costumes
Rental of office equipment for non-business use see 320232, 690111, 690119, 690120, 690210690230
Same as 230122 - owned vacation home; vacation
condos and coops
Encyclopedia and other sets of reference books
School books, supplies, and equipment for
vocational or technical school
Men?s other clothing, incl. costumes
Rental and repair of photographic equipment
Rental of boat or non camper-type trailer, such as
for boat or cycle on out-of-town trips
Tape recorder and player
Interest on home equity loan - owned vacation
home
School books, supplies, and equipment for day
care centers and nursery schools
Outboard motor
Rental of televisions
Same as 240322 - owned vacation home
Same as 240312 - owned vacation home
Parking at owned vacation home, vacation condos
and coops
Rental of VCR, radio, and sound equipment - see
310210, 310311-310330
Silver serving pieces
Trash and garbage collection - rented vacation
property
Rental of video software
Rental of video hardware/accessories
Same as 240112 - owned vacation home
Rental of video or computer hardware or
software
Rental of all boats and outboard motors
Rental of non camper-type trailer, such as for
boat or cycle
Same as 320622 - owned vacation home
Septic tank cleaning - owned vacation home
Same as 240122 - owned vacation home
Same as 240222 - owned vacation home
337 UCCs that are not shareable

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Private vehicles (fixed costs)
Private vehicles (variable costs)
Private vehicles (variable costs)

0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004

Vacation homes

0.003

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.003
0.003

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.003

Vacation homes

0.003

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.002

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.002

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.002
0.002

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.002

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.001

Vacation homes

0.001

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.001

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Vacation homes
Vacation homes

0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001

Vacation homes

0.001

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.001

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.001

Vacation homes

0.001

Tools, media, gear, etc.
Tools, media, gear, etc.
Vacation homes

0.000
0.000
0.000

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.000

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.000

Tools, media, gear, etc.

0.000

Vacation homes
Vacation homes
Vacation homes
Vacation homes
Uncategorized

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
74.566
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